Max Verstappen wrestled Japanese Grand Prix victory from the jaws of McLaren defeat with his breathtaking qualifying exploits.
It was the kind of performance you simply cannot legislate for. The Dutchman is brilliant and he reminded us of that yet again at Suzuka.
But there is more to the story of the weekend than that obvious and immediate, convenient-for-McLaren narrative suggests.
Before I get truly stuck into the wider implications, I thought it prudent to explain the name of the column: you simply cannot be a journalist of any description with the first initial S and surname Coop (scoop) and not utilise that. And no, I did not become a journalist because of it; it is merely a happy coincidence – and opportunity.
It is in a similar vein to the reasoning that led me to believe as a child that because my name is Sam, I had to be a fireman when I grew up (Fireman Sam was a popular TV show for kids in the United Kingdom during the 1990s), but I digress…
Verstappen leaves Suzuka just one point behind Lando Norris in the F1 drivers’ title fight, with the pair and Oscar Piastri – who is a further 12 points adrift – having split grand prix victory at the opening three rounds of the campaign equally.
However, the seemingly persistent strategic weakness the race re-uncovered at McLaren is far more damaging than any points swing secured by the Red Bull driver.
Breaking down McLaren’s perplexing pit stop strategy
Suzuka is notoriously difficult to overtake at, particularly in contemporary F1, meaning the outcome of the race was almost entirely dependant on either the start or strategy – and Verstappen managed the former perfectly.
Data from the grand prix shows the Dutchman comfortably had enough in hand to respond to any attempt Norris made to close the gap he built in the opening laps and exert pressure on him.
Therefore, all was down to the pit stop phase and whether McLaren could leverage having the Briton and team-mate Piastri following close behind the Red Bull in a two vs. one scenario.
This opened up a multitude of options for the Woking squad, but instead of rolling the dice, it played it safe – with both cars.
Aside from the reality that in F1, sometimes what appears to be the optimal strategy is, in fact, not, McLaren ought to have gambled with at least one if its drivers, but did not.
When Mercedes pitted George Russell on lap 19, McLaren brought Piastri in the following lap to cover him off. Both Norris and Verstappen came in together at the end of lap 21.
Post-race, Christian Horner said Red Bull pre-empted the second McLaren coming in, figuring they would be stopped consecutively.
Former racing driver Naomi Schiff called the Woking squad’s strategy “too conservative”, which it evidently was – to the extent the team was predictable.
not only does it kneecap McLaren’s ability to gamble, for fear it might advantage or disadvantage one driver over the other, it corners the Woking squad into being paralysed by indecision…
In being so easy to read, it gave up the most significant advantage the chasing team has: the element of surprise. By trailing, McLaren could have controlled the pit window.
In many ways it did, by pitting Piastri a lap ahead of Verstappen, but that in itself is something that leads on to its most egregious strategic miscalculation.
Beside the fact Ferrari did not bring in Charles Leclerc (the car between Piastri in third and Russell in fifth) until lap 21, who still came out ahead of the British driver, dismantling McLaren’s justification for stopping the Australian when it did, it pitted its drivers the wrong way round.
It is the exact same thing that led to all kinds of difficulties for the team at the Hungarian Grand Prix last season and it appears the constructors’ champion has not learned.
Given the Red Bull’s slow pit stop with Verstappen, had McLaren brought Norris in first, he almost certainly would have successfully undercut the Dutchman, setting up a likely victory.
However, plainly labelling the problem strategic weakness does not accurately acknowledge the nucleus of the issue: its ‘two number one drivers’ stance.
© McLaren
How it leaves the door open for Verstappen
This is more encompassing than, and a slight departure from, the papaya rules debate. On that front, McLaren actually got things right.
The team chose not to swap its drivers in the dying stages of the grand prix, but Piastri was still free to race Norris.
Yes, given the specifics of Suzuka, he could not get past his team-mate on his own, but if he wanted the chance to attack Verstappen, he should have done a better job in qualifying.
In that moment, for better or for worse, McLaren was true to its values. Showing directly preferential treatment, especially at this stage of the season, is a recipe for disaster.
That said, when it comes to strategic differentials, the team appears scared of upsetting either driver by making a wrong call.
How that manifests is that not only does it kneecap McLaren’s ability to gamble, for fear it might advantage or disadvantage one driver over the other, it corners the Woking squad into being paralysed by indecision – hardly what you want baked into your decision-making process.
This is the darker side of having two number one drivers in a team. You could comfortably bet good money on Red Bull playing the hand McLaren was dealt at Suzuka differently, and it probably would have won race, too.
But it is believed that not only has Piastri received equal status assurances from McLaren, parity with Norris has been written into his recent contract extension.
A smart move by the Australian’s manager, Mark Webber, who is acutely aware of – and perhaps still sensitive to – the perils of being a number two driver, given his treatment at Red Bull alongside Sebastian Vettel.
However, it is seemingly causing problems for McLaren, and the team’s approach ultimately risks doing its drivers a disservice in the long run.
With Verstappen performing at the level he is to remain in the title hunt, showing he will prey on any opportunity he is afforded, McLaren’s current inability to roll the dice could prove deathly for both Norris and Piastri’s drivers’ championship aspirations.
Do you think McLaren made a key strategic error in its pursuit of Verstappen? Let us know by voting below in the latest poll by RacingNews365.
